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Abstract
The recall of 90 magazine advertisements, consisting of a Brand, a Picture and a Slogan, was tested by presenting one of 
these components as cue and asking for the other two. The advertisements were tested in groups of ten, each group requir-
ing a sequence of 30 test trials (10 advertisements × 3 cues). Backwards analysis of the sequences of responses—that is, 
starting with the last trial and comparing it successively with the responses on earlier trials—identified many responses as 
repetitions of previous errors, replicating many of the findings in Laming, D. On the recall of errors in recall. JSMC Brain 
Science, 2019, 3: 21, https ://www.resea rchga te.net/publi catio n/33344 8328_On_The_Recal l_Of_Error s_In_Recal l. Nine 
different groups of advertisements were tested after various lapses of time up to 4 months. A comparison is made between 
the (short term) probability of repeating a previous error as a function of lag within a single test sequence and the (longer 
term) probability of retrieving an advertisement as a function of elapsed time. Both these empirical relationships can be 
characterised by reciprocal functions, but they are otherwise quite different. Extrapolation of long-term accessibility to short 
intervals suggests recall in the short term could be much better than it is; extrapolation of short-term accessibility to longer 
intervals poses the contrary problem. Even though the only relevant variable in this comparison appears to be lapse of time, 
there is a question whether this comparison between short and long term is truly like with like.
Introduction
Jones (1976) proposed the Fragmentation Hypothesis, which 
says, simply, that a stimulus fragments in memory. An 
advertisement consisting of a Brand name (B), a Picture (P) 
and a Slogan (S) might fragment in any of five identifiably 
different ways, illustrated in Fig. 1. If all three components 
are contained in a single fragment (BPS), then any compo-
nent as cue will elicit recall of the other two. If, however, a 
fragment links only brand and picture (BP, S), then brand as 
cue will elicit recall of picture and picture as cue will give 
brand, but slogan is not accessible from either, nor will it 
retrieve anything when presented as cue. Likewise (BS, P) 
and (PS, B). Finally, a Null fragment yields only guesses.
The critical test of this hypothesis consists of cueing each 
stimulus by each of its components in turn (Jones, 1978), 
but separated, of course, by tests of other stimuli, and then 
assembling the responses to the three cues addressing each 
stimulus in a table (Table 1). Depending on the fragmenta-
tion of the stimulus in memory (Fig. 1), a particular pattern 
of responses should be correct. For example, if Brand and 
Picture are contained in the same fragment, but not Slogan 
(i.e. BP, S above), Brand as cue will retrieve the correct 
picture and Picture as cue the correct brand, but Slogan will 
be missing. Five such patterns are possible – except that the 
pattern in Table 1 might be augmented by a lucky guess.
Lansdale and Laming (1995) reported such an experi-
ment, testing memory for nine colour slides of a billiards 
table with a coloured ball somewhere between the centre 
pockets (nine different colours, but not red), a distinctive pat-
tern of eight red balls somewhere on the further half of the 
table (nine different patterns) and a white object on the left 
hand edge of the table (nine different objects). Participants 
were presented with one of the components from one of the 
stimuli and asked to recall the other two. They were asked 
to guess if they could not recall. There were 27 test trials of 
each presentation set of nine stimuli and successive trials 
presented a different attribute (colour, pattern or object) as 
cue addressing a different stimulus. While nearly half of 
the assembled matrices of responses to a common stimulus 
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conformed exactly to the fragmentation hypothesis (that is, 
without any augmentation from lucky guesses), most of the 
‘lucky guesses’ in the other half of the data turned out to be 
repetitions, complete or in part, of response combinations 
on previous test trials.
This finding led to a re-analysis of the data ab initio. 
Instead of asking of each response combination whether it 
was correct, Laming (2019) asked where had it come from, 
because the prevalence of repetitions of combinations of 
responses from some previous trial meant that most of 
those combinations must have been recorded in memory. 
Suppose, for example, the first recall of a stimulus is com-
pletely correct and the second cueing accesses the record of 
that first recall, rather than the original stimulus; this gener-
ates a spurious correlation between successive cueings of 
the kind implied by Fig. 1. The pattern of data that emerges 
persuasively suggests the fragmentation hypothesis, with-
out that hypothesis having any relevance to memory. In this 
way an investigation that began with a plausible hypothesis 
about the structure of memories turned into an empirical 
exploration of recall in the short term. There are, of course, 
very many studies of recall over short periods of time. What 
was different in Lansdale and Laming (1995) is that par-
ticipants had no instruction about remembering their previ-
ous responses—nothing at all was said—it just happened 
naturally.
This paper reports another experiment of similar design 
using advertisements consisting of a Brand name (B), a Pic-
ture (P) and a Slogan (S), culled from glossy magazines. It 
was a student project conducted during the academic year 
1983/1984, with, of course, the resources available at that 
time.1 It was intended to discover, first, whether ‘everyday 
stimuli’ would fragment in the same way as purposefully 
constructed stimuli and, second, to pose this question: If, 
in course of time, a stimulus is forgotten, how does that 
come about? If the fragmentation hypothesis truly repre-
sents the state of nature, then forgetting must subsist either 
in fragments in memory breaking up or simply disappearing. 
Joensen, Gaskell & Horner (2019) have very recently posed 
this same question, whether a complex stimulus (a triple 
associate in their experiments) is forgotten all-or-none or 
by progressive loss of individual components. The experi-
ment was designed to identify the fragment representations 
of the original stimuli after various periods of time. Nine 
sets of advertisements were presented for retention at the 
same point in time with different sets tested after different 
intervals ranging from 20 min to 4 months.
Anticipating the results, repetition of response combina-
tions on preceding test trials again generates a pattern of 
data that persuasively suggests the fragmentation hypoth-
esis, without that hypothesis representing any structures in 
memory. So the question put ceases to be relevant. Instead 
there is a comparison between the decreasing frequency of 
repetitions with lag within the one sequence of test trials 
and the similar decrease of accessibility over much longer 











(a) BPS (b) BP, S
(c) BS, P (d) PS, B
(e) Null
Fig. 1  The fragmentation hypothesis for stimuli comprised of Brand, 
Picture and Slogan
Table 1  Responses to the three cues addressing a common stimulus
Cue/Response Brand Picture Slogan
Brand – √ e
Picture √ – e
Slogan e e –
1 I thank Kate Paveley and Sally Wheatley who carried out this 
experimental project as part of their third-year coursework in the 
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, 
in 1983–1984.




The stimuli were 90 advertisements culled from glossy mag-
azines. Each advert consisted of a brand name (B), a picture 
(P) of the product and a slogan (S). They were divided into 
nine product groups (cosmetics, fashion, food and drink, fur-
niture, technology, holidays, jewellery, perfumes and shoes) 
with ten advertisements in each group. Each product group 
was tested in a separate session, lest the mixing of, say, per-
fumes and food in the same test provided additional informa-
tion which brand name, picture and slogan went together.
Procedure
The stimuli were presented on slides in a Kodak carousel 
projector at 15 s intervals. The slides were ordered such 
that every ninth slide came from the same product group, 
with the different product groups cycled in a fixed order. 
The presentation of the stimuli began about 7 pm on a Fri-
day evening. The participants viewed the slides as a group 
and then proceeded directly to the first test. There followed 
supper in the laboratory, with two further tests that same 
evening. The participants returned the following morning 
(Saturday, 10 am) for a further test and, thereafter, different 
product groups were tested at intervals as set out in Table 2. 
Except for the test on Saturday morning, all subsequent tests 
began at 6 pm. Retention intervals are measured from the 
mid-point of the presentation set to the mid-point of the test 
trials.
Testing
Each product group was tested with a series of 30 cues on 
slides, each slide showing one component from one of the 
stimuli. A picture cue showed the picture from the original 
advertisement with the brand and slogan blanked out. Brand 
names and slogans were typed in Times 12 pt, the brand 
names in capitals, and photographed against a black ground. 
The slides were ordered such that each stimulus was tested 
every 10 trials and successive slides always cued different 
attributes. Participants were given booklets and asked to 
write on each page, first the cue and then the two attributes 
paired with it in the stimulus.2 To assist, a complete set of 
brand names, slogans and pictures was projected on a screen. 
(The purpose of the experiment was to test recall of the asso-
ciations between Brand, Picture and Slogan [cf. Fig. 1]; there 
was no expectation that participants would remember Brand 
or Slogan exactly.) The pictures were labelled A,…,J and 
the brand names and slogans were ordered alphabetically 
to obscure any association between them. Participants were 
instructed to select a guess from this screen if they could not 
remember. They were tested as a group, with 30 s allowed 
for responding to each cue. There were a small number of 
failures to write down any answer at all.
Preliminary training
To explain the nature of the stimuli and the method of test-
ing, participants were shown an example of a stimulus (a 
girl reaching for a bottle of Martell brandy with the slogan 
“Look no further”); a practice set of six advertisements for 
cars; and an explanation of how memory would be tested, 
with reference to an answer booklet, a display of the brand 
names, slogans and pictures of the six cars, and slides pre-
senting the three cues for the advertisement for Martell 
brandy. Participants were then tested on the six car adver-
tisements, using the procedure described above for the main 
experiment. This preliminary training preceded the presenta-
tion of the 90 advertisements for the main experiment.
Participants
The participants were 30 undergraduate friends of the two 
students, who carried out this research project as part of their 
third-year course in psychology at the University of Cam-
bridge (Paveley 1984; Wheatley 1984; personal communica-
tions). It is inevitable in such an experiment that participants 
will not attend all the testing sessions. The number tested 
decreased from 30 to a minimum of 14 over four months (see 
Table 1) and only 11 presented themselves for every test. 
The participants were tested for colour blindness in advance 
of the experiment using the Ishihara test. They were paid £10 
for their participation.
Table 2  Schedule of testing sessions in the recall of advertisements










Furniture 18 9 weeks (i.e., the next term)
Jewellery 16 16 weeks
2 This experiment was conducted in 1983–1984 with the resources 
and facilities then available.
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Terminology
‘Brand’, ‘Picture’ and ‘Slogan’ are attributes of the stimuli; a 
particular instance of an attribute will be called a component 
or, where appropriate, a response. Each product group was 
tested with a series of 30 test trials, on which the different 
stimuli were cued in turn, three times each. The combination 
of cue and two responses on a test trial is an answer, except 
that it will sometimes be necessary to distinguish answers 
that are copies of the answer on the immediately preceding 
trial, answer (lag 0) or, simply, Ans0, from the rest. The 
individual components of an answer are the cue and (two) 
responses.
The analysis begins by examining the repetition of pre-
vious recalls. A BPS match (links in blue in Fig. 2) indi-
cates an answer that can be sourced, either directly (Trial 
38) or via previous correct recalls (Trials 34 and 37), to 
the stimulus. ‘BP’,‘BS’ and ‘PS’ indicate pair matches that 
can likewise be sourced to a stimulus (Trials 34, 22 and 18 
in Fig. 2, shown in pale blue) and the links are now shown 
dashed. Where one answer exactly matches the cue and two 
responses on some previous test trial (but not a correct recall 
of a stimulus), I speak of the recall of an answer (‘Ans’ or 
‘Ans0’, green links in Fig. 2,). The presumed source of such 
a recall might itself be the recall of a previous error (Trials 
35 and 40) or might be a complete guess (Trial 35; its source 
on Trial 24 has itself no identifiable source). If only one 
response (and the cue) match the answer on some previous 
trial, that is a cued pair (‘cpr’, Trials 30 and 37). In the case 
that both responses, but not the cue, match some previous 
answer, I speak of a yoked pair (‘ypr’, Trials 25 and 32). 
Finally, a yoked guess is a pair of responses that match some 
stimulus other than the correct one (‘ygs’, Trial 14). The 
analyses that follow repeatedly compare these 10 different 
categories of recall.
Results
The analysis of the experiment below follows the backwards 
pattern in Laming (2019); that is, instead of looking only at 
the correlations between the three cueings of each stimulus, 
the analysis works backwards through each set of test trials, 
examining the correlations between each combination of 
cue and two responses and all preceding such combinations, 
Trial Cue Brand Picture Slogan Match 
11 P GIVENCHY A And nothing else PS Stimulus 1 
12 B ARMANI I Seal it with a Null 
13 S PARADOX C Cool and passionate BPS Stimulus 3 
14 B SHALIMAR E Serenely mysterious ygs Stimulus 5 
15 S SHALIMAR E Serenely mysterious Ans0 
16 P JE REVIENS F As modern as BPS Stimulus 6 
17 B GIANNI VERSACE A Le Parfum Null 
18 P GIVENCHY H Seal it with a PS Stimulus 8 
19 S ARPÉGE I Les plus tendre PS Stimulus 9 
20 P ARMANI J As modern as Null 
21 B ARPÉGE I Les plus tendre  Ans 
22 S ARMANI D Le Parfum BS Stimulus 2 
23 P PARADOX C Cool and passionate BPS 
24 S MITSOUKO G Not a perfume for Null 
25 P ARMANI E Le Parfum ypr 
26 B JE REVIENS F As modern as BPS 
27 S ANAIS ANAIS G The “Renaissance” PS Stimulus 7 
28 B CHOC DE CARDIN I Serenely mysterious Null 
29 P GIANNI VERSACE I Les plus tendre  PS 
30 B GIVENCHY A A name to remember cpr 
31 S SHALIMAR B And nothing else Null 
32 P GIVENCHY B A name to remember ypr 
33 B PARADOX C Cool and passionate BPS 
34 P SHALIMAR D Les plus tendre  BP Stimulus 4 
35 B MITSOUKO G Not a perfume for Ans 
36 S JE REVIENS F As modern as BPS 
37 P SHALIMAR G Not a perfume for cpr 
38 S CHOC DE CARDIN H Seal it with a BPS Stimulus 8 
39 B ANAIS ANAIS G The “Renaissance” Ans 
40 S GIVENCHY A A name to remember Ans 
Fig. 2  Sample data from one presentation set by one participant. Tri-
als 1–10 are the stimuli (not shown); Trials 11–40 are the test trials. 
Columns 3–5 give the combination of cue and responses actually 
observed; the cue is additionally highlighted in bold. The arrows link 
each recall with its presumed source; a continuous line indicates a 
complete repetition, a broken line a pair match only. The nature of 
the match is listed in Column 6 (BPS = completely correct; BP, BS, 
PS = one response correct; Ans = complete recall of a previous erro-
neous trial; cpr = one response and the cue matching; ypr = a pair of 
responses, neither matching the cue; ygs = a pair of responses match-
ing a wrong stimulus). ‘Null’ indicates two independent guesses with 
no identifiable source
2432 Psychological Research (2021) 85:2428–2443
1 3
including the original stimuli. This divides recalls into those 
that were sourced from within the present test series (these 
recalls should be unaffected by the delay since presenta-
tion of the stimuli) and recalls which necessarily access the 
original stimuli, distant in time.
I present two different analyses of the data:
 1. An analysis of repetitions of previous errors, subdi-
vided into
 (i) Incidence;
 (ii) Conditional proportions of repetitions; and
 (iii) Lag-recall curves.
This first analysis examines all of the data from all of 
the participants and is, therefore, not representative of the 
decreases in recall over time.
2. Comparisons of responding after different lapses of time 
by those 11 participants who attended all nine test ses-
sions.
I emphasise that none of these analyses are concerned 
with testing the fragmentation hypothesis—only with the 
probable source of each response.
Repetitions of previous errors
This first analysis seeks to establish that certain categories of 
error must have been recorded in memory. The participants 
viewed the stimuli with specific instructions to remember 
them, and it is taken for granted that the stimuli were indeed 
recorded in memory. It then becomes essential to distinguish 
carefully between recalls of stimuli and recalls of recalls of 
stimuli, on the one hand, and repetitions of errors on the 
other, lest the frequencies of repetition of errors be arte-
factually inflated with recalls of stimuli. While this might 
seem obvious, the second analysis below will proceed from 
a different standpoint.
For each test trial n (n = 11,…, 40), the analysis works 
backwards from trial n-1 to 11 and then through the stimulus 
set, looking for the best match to the cue and two responses. 
A previous answer or stimulus that matches all three attrib-
utes is always deemed a more probable source than a match 
of only two. Given two matches of three (or two), the most 
recent (smallest lag) is preferred over the more remote. So, 
the analysis looks first for a match to all three attributes. 
This may be the stimulus addressed at trial n, or a previ-
ous recall of that stimulus or it may be some other previous 
answer, of necessity containing an error. Answers that copy 
the answer on the immediately preceding trial (Ans0—an 
answer that might be still ‘in mind’ at the time) are dis-
tinguished from other repetitions of complete answers. An 
important question is whether such repetitions are merely 
apparent, due to chance, or whether they indicate a true 
recall from memory.
The probability of a match occurring by chance on trial 
n, not this particular match, but any match, depends on the 
number of previous answers that could be matched by a suit-
able choice of responses. Irrespective of whether an answer 
is actually recalled, and provided only there is no complete 
recall of the stimulus, the analysis counts the number x of 
different previous answers containing the cue presented on 
trial n. That number varies from trial to trial. There is also 
some number of combinations of two responses (99, because 
the stimulus addressed must be excluded from the calcula-
tion) that might have been output at trial n. The probability 
of matching a previous answer (any previous answer) by 
chance is therefore x/99. The occurrence of such a match is 
a Bernoulli variable with variance (1 − x/99)(x/99). The sum 
of such variables over the totality of trials is a generalised 
binomial, with mean equal to the sum of the probabilities 
and variance to the sum of the individual variances. This 
is compared with the number of answers actually recalled. 
The calculation is explained in great detail in Lansdale and 
Laming (1995, pp. 44–50). It turns out that the sum of the 
Bernoulli probabilities is small in relation to the number of 
previous errors that are repeated, so that most such repeti-
tions must have been true recalls from memory.
If the answer on trial n is not a complete repetition of 
any previous answer, the analysis looks for combinations of 
two matching attributes. Such a combination may consist of 
the cue and one matching attribute (a cued pair) or the two 
attributes excluding the cue (a yoked pair).3 An answer con-
taining a single correct response is now excluded from the 
calculation to preclude the number of matches being inflated 
by partial recalls of stimuli. If the most recent matching pair 
is a cued pair, or if there is no matching pair, the probability 
of a cued pair is calculated, along the lines set out above 
for an answer; except that additional combinations of cue 
and responses must now be excluded from the calculation 
because, if they occurred, they would be classified as the 
recall of an answer. Likewise, if the most recent matching 
pair is a yoked pair, or if there is no matching pair, the prob-
ability of a yoked pair is calculated. The Bernoulli probabili-
ties and variances are summed to provide a generalised bino-
mial variable for comparison with the total number of cued/
yoked pairs recalled. The analysis of yoked pairs extends 
to the stimuli, where a match is separately classified as a 
yoked guess. It was discovered in Laming (2019) that yoked 
3 It is possible for the same answer to match both a cued pair from 
one previous trial and a yoked pair from another, but not from the 
same trial. Selecting the most recent of multiple matches gives a 
unique categorization.
2433Psychological Research (2021) 85:2428–2443 
1 3
pairs and yoked guesses did not differ, either in assigned 
confidence or in the distributions of latencies. However, 
the distinction is important in the present study because 
yoked pairs are retrieved from recent test trials, while yoked 
guesses are retrievals from the original stimuli, which may 
have been presented up to four months previously. These 
additional calculations are also explained in great detail in 
Lansdale and Laming (1995, pp. 44–50).
Table 3 records the incidences of the different categories 
of repeated errors. ‘Total trials’ in Column 3 is the number 
of test trials, conditional on the cue, on which a repetition 
of the designated category might have been observed. These 
numbers relate to a total of 1960 test trials with each attrib-
ute as cue, from which double-correct answers (and, for pair 
matches, single–correct and repeated answers) have been 
deleted. Moreover, an erroneous recall cannot be repeated 
until it has itself been uttered, so that for test trials early in 
the sequence of 30 there are no previous errors that could 
be repeated. In the light of these restrictions, the propor-
tions actually recorded relative to the numbers of trials on 
which each kind of repetition might have been observed 
(Answers at lag 0: 50.7%; Answers at lag > 0: 23.8%; Cued 
pairs: 23.9%; Yoked pairs: 17.4%; Yoked guesses: 8.6%) are 
considerable. These results are comparable to those obtained 
from a re-analysis of the data from Lansdale and Laming 
(1995: resp. 58.6%, 16.1%, 21.7%, 20.0% and 11.0%; see 
Laming, 2019).
For every sub-category except four the significance is 
beyond dispute and most of those repetitions must have been 
true recalls from memory. The four exceptions are recalls of 
BS pairs, either to one of the attributes as cue or as a yoked 
pair to P as cue and also BP pairs retrieved as a yoked guess 
from the stimulus. The evidence relating to yoked guesses is, 
however, weak; aggregating the data for all three categories 
of cue, χ2 (N = 1856) = 6.238 with 1 d.f., p = 0.013. This is 
to be expected given the lapse of time between presentation 
of the stimuli and test.
BP and PS pairs are common, both as cued pairs and as 
yoked pairs, but Brand and Slogan do not cohere well; that 
is, the picture plays a pivotal role in the memory of these 
advertisements. Participants readily attach a brand or a slo-
gan to a picture, but do not equally link brand and slogan 
together by themselves. In Lansdale and Laming (1995) it 
Table 3  Incidences of different categories of repeated errors in the recall of magazine advertisements, with a statistical assessment of each cat-
egory
† Normal deviate from binomial test with probability 1/99
Cue attribute Response 
attribute(s)
Total trials Number 
observed
95% confidence interval Proportion Chance expectation Chi-square Significance
Lag 0 answer fragments
 B PS 90 44 0.489 0.000 0.000† 0.000
 P BS 89 37 0.416 0.000 0.000† 0.000
 S BP 107 56 0.523 0.000 0.000† 0.000
Lag > 0 answer fragments
 B PS 581 172 2.444, 13.379 0.296 7.9118 3459.72 0.000
 P BS 531 146 2.132, 12.721 0.275 7.4265 2631.3 0.000
 S BP 609 177 2.923, 14.334 0.291 8.6286 3345.53 0.000
Cued pairs
 B P 304 73 29.184, 52.087 0.240 40.6352 30.6844 0.000
 B S 322 37 30.588, 53.981 0.115 42.2842 0.7841 0.376
 P B 294 65 28.448, 51.091 0.221 39.7694 19.0774 0.000
 P S 273 80 25.114, 46.665 0.293 35.8895 64.3765 0.000
 S B 339 44 33.598, 57.889 0.130 45.7437 0.0792 0.778
 S P 345 105 33.998, 58.393 0.304 46.1954 89.2889 0.000
Yoked pairs
 B PS 639 116 44.679, 72.857 0.182 58.7678 63.3878 0.000
 P BS 503 62 38.112, 64.326 0.123 51.2192 2.5988 0.107
 S BP 657 132 52.759, 82.807 0.201 67.7829 70.1813 0.000
Yoked guesses
 B PS 639 63 32.142, 57.346 0.099 44.7439 0.005 0.005
 P BS 568 42 31.194, 56.019 0.074 43.6063 0.800 0.800
 S BP 649 54 30.731, 55.521 0.083 43.126 0.086 0.086
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was colour and object that cohered—very plausibly because 
those two attributes had names, whereas the patterns did not.
Conditional proportions of repetitions
Many repetitions are repetitions of previous repetitions. Fig-
ure 3 presents the probability of each category of repetition 
conditional on the presumed source. For each trial counted 
in ‘Total trials’ in Table 2 (col. 3) there are one or more 
prior trials that could have been retrieved to generate the 
corresponding category of repetition. The category of the 
source is taken from the most recent of those prior trials. The 
number of instances of each source serves as the denomina-
tor for the probability of repetition in Fig. 3.
The proportions of repetitions simply reflect a continu-
ing incidence of repetitions as trials proceed, except for two 
significant features. First, if the trial cue on trial n + 1 is also 
one of the responses on the immediately preceding trial (n), 
repetition of that preceding trial (Ans0) is highly probable 
(av. 0.835), except in the case that the preceding trial is Null 
(two unrelated guesses with no identifiable source; 0.218). 
Second, the average proportion of repetitions for answers 
(lag > 0) is 0.244, but increases to 0.653 (see Fig. 4 below) 
when the source is itself an (identical) answer. Complete 
(erroneous) answers tend especially to be repeated.
The repetition of erroneous answers applies equally 
to correct recalls. A completely correct recall at first test 
installs an additional copy of the stimulus in memory to 
support an increased likelihood of a correct recall at the 
next test trial. Figure 4 shows the proportions of completely 
correct (BPS) answers following each sequence of preceding 
correct and incorrect test trials addressing that stimulus. The 
proportion correct on first test is 0.380 and, if subsequent 
tests depended solely on independent access to the stimulus, 
the proportion of three correct BPS answers would be 0.055. 
The proportion of three correct BPS answers in sequence 
is 0.330. It is plain from Fig. 4 that a correct (BPS) answer 
greatly increases the conditional probability of a correct 
answer on the next test.
There is no feedback following any of the tests in Fig. 4, 
no further sight of the stimulus, so that the sequence of suc-
cessive recalls should be a martingale (see Laming, 2005).4 
This means that, while the probabilities following particu-
lar sequences of recalls diverge, the expectation remains 
unchanged. To emphasise this property, the small black cir-
cles show the means at the second and third trials; they are 
linked to the preceding data points representing the propor-
tions correct on the preceding trial. There is a slight increase 
in the average proportions recalled correctly (cp. Izawa, 
1971, p. 201). At the same time the probabilities attaching to 
the different sequences of correct and wrong recalls diverge 
(as is obvious in Fig. 4). Continued long enough, those pro-
portions would diverge to either 0 or 1 (cp. Izawa, 1969).
The open circles in Fig. 4 are predictions from a model 
in Appendix A of Laming (2019). There are three test trials 
for each stimulus spaced at intervals of ten within the trial 
sequence; the combinations of responses on those test tri-
als have different accessibilities (probabilities of retrieval). 



















CPO CP CO PO Ans0 Ans cpr ypr ygs Null
Answer (lag 0) Answer (lag > 0) Yoked pair Yoked guessCued pair























Fig. 4  Proportions of completely correct (BPS) answers as a func-
tion of ordinal number of test trial and outcomes on preceding tests. 
The corresponding proportions for repeated answers are shown for 
comparison. The small black circles represent the mean proportions 
correct on the second and third trials; they are linked to the preced-
ing data points to emphasise that the process is a martingale. The 
open circles are predictions from a model in Appendix A in Laming 
(2019).
4 A sequence of random variables X1, X2,…,Xn is a martingale if the 
expectation of Xn+1 = Xn. An immediate consequence is that the vari-
ance of the variables Xn is continually increasing. Since the propor-
tions in Fig. 3 are constrained to the interval (0,1), each sequence of 
probability of recall will ultimately diverge to either 0 or 1.
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assumed constant, but thereafter a1 is the accessibility of 
the responses on the previous test trial (the first trial at the 
second test, but the second trial at the third test) and, at the 
third test only, a2 is the accessibility of the first test. The 
model assumes the data to be homogenous when the fre-
quencies are aggregated over nine different sets of stimuli, 
tested after very different lapses of time and with very dif-
ferent levels of correct recalls. The parameter estimates are: 
âs = 0.420 for the stimulus, â1 = 0.754 for the preceding trial 
and â2 = 0.345. The parameter â1 is greater than â2 because 
it refers to a more recent trial (lag 9 instead of lag 19) and âs 
is smaller, because of the lapse of time between presentation 
of the stimuli and test. The black squares in Fig. 4 show the 
corresponding proportions for repeated answers. At first test 
they show the proportion of answers (lag > 0) sourced from 
pair and Null sources (0.209) and, at second test, the pro-
portion of answers sourced from previous answers (0.653).
To sum up: Repeated errors are often sourced from previ-
ous repetitions. The relation between source and repetition 
is of no apparent significance except for repetitions of the 
immediately preceding trial and for repeated answers. The 
same process applies to correct recalls, where it generates 
a martingale; the expected unconditional proportion of cor-
rect recalls does not change, but individual (conditional) 
sequences diverge.
Lag‑recall curves
Each recall of an answer, a cued pair or a yoked pair may 
be sourced from any preceding test trial, and Fig. 5 presents 
the probabilities that the trial at lag l is the source for each 
of these kinds of error. Recalls of previous answers and cued 
pairs display conventional recency, decreasing from 0.5 for 
the immediately preceding answer to zero at a lag of 29. 
This aligns the present experiment with free recall (see esp. 
Tan and Ward, 2000). Note that the number of answers that 
might be recalled decreases progressively as lag increases, 
and the lag-recall relation becomes increasingly variable. A 
lag of 29, for example, can be realised only when the last test 
trial reproduces the answer at the first.
The estimated probabilities for yoked pairs have been 
increased nine-fold for the following reason: A yoked pair 
can be sourced from any previous answer that does not 
include the present cue (else the recall would be classified 
as an answer). An answer, on the other hand, can be sourced 
only from a previous trial on which the present cue was pro-
duced as a response. There are nine times as many trials that 
might be the source of a yoked pair as of an answer, but only 
the same number of opportunities for recall. Increasing the 
estimated probabilities of yoked pairs redresses this dispar-
ity. With this adjustment, yoked pairs show inverse recency 
up to lag 8 (Kendall rank correlation 0.500, p = 0.030, one-
tailed, comparing lags 0–8 only); thereafter their probabili-
ties decrease much as do those for answers. This replicates a 
similar result from Laming (2019). (Curiously, PS pairs also 
show inverse recency up to lag 4: Kendall rank correlation 
0.800, p = 0.025, one-tailed).
The histogram bars at the right hand end of the abscissa 
in Fig. 5 indicate the proportions of, respectively, complete 
correct (BPS) recalls, correct BP, BS and PS pair recalls 
and yoked guesses (that is, sourced from a stimulus). The 
proportion of BPS recalls is calculated with respect to the 
total number (5880) of test trials; the proportions of correct 
pair recalls with respect to the residual numbers of trials 
(respectively, 2253, 2288, 2275) on which a correct pair 
recall might be observed (i.e., conditional on no BPS recall); 
and the proportion of yoked guesses again with respect to 
the residual number (2504; i.e., conditional on neither a BPS 
nor a correct pair recall). Excepting BPS recalls, the propor-
tions of correct pairs and yoked guesses are comparable to 
the recall of cued pairs and yoked pairs at medium lag (say 
15).
The black dashed curve is a reciprocal, agreeing with the 
proportion of answer recalls at lag 0 and approximating the 
variation of answer repetitions thereafter. It has equation
The 2.09 is the reciprocal of the proportion of answers 
(lag 0), while the 0.65 is chosen to take the curve close to the 
greater part of the proportions of answer repetitions.
The inverse recency exhibited by yoked pairs requires 
explanation and poses the question how yoked pairs and 
erroneous answers are retrieved from memory in the first 
place. To summarise the argument in Laming (2019): The 
negative recency shown by yoked pairs means that they 






















Fig. 5  Lag-recall curves for answers, cued pairs and yoked pairs. The 
histogram bars at the right hand end of the abscissa are the propor-
tions of, respectively, complete correct (BPS) recalls, correct BP, BS 
and PS pair recalls and yoked guesses. The black dashed curve is a 
reciprocal, agreeing with the proportion of answer recalls at lag 0 and 
approximating the variation of answer repetitions thereafter
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display a different lag-recency relation to cued pairs and 
answers. If yoked pairs were retrieved by selecting a compo-
nent at random and using that component as cue to retrieve 
its partner, yoked pairs would exhibit the same lag-recency 
relation as cued pairs. So yoked pairs must be retrieved as 
pairs, from a single retrieval. Further, if repeated answers 
were recorded only when a yoked pair happened to match 
the trial cue, they would exhibit the same lag-recency rela-
tion as yoked pairs. So answers must be retrieved as triples.
Suppose the trial at Lag l does not contain a match to 
the trial cue. An answer retrieved spontaneously from that 
trial would tell the participant that that particular answer 
is wrong (because it fails to match the trial cue). Entering 
such a retrieval at the head of the mnemonic record would 
suppress a potential yoked guess (because from the head of 
the record the answer would be retrieved complete) and the 
positive recency of answers in Fig. 5 is thereby reflected in a 
negative recency of yoked guesses. It is assumed that, freed 
from this suppression, yoked pairs would exhibit the usual 
decreasing form of lag-recency curve. So, at a sufficiently 
long lag the probability of retrieving an answer decreases 
to the point that the suppression of yoked pairs is no longer 
apparent in relation to its own lag-recency curve. Hence the 
limited range of negative recency. In the case of PS pairs the 
explanation is simply that at short lags the complete answer 
tends to be retrieved in place of the pair.
Lapse of time
The preceding analysis found that many recalls are repe-
titions, in whole or in part, of previous recalls. It follows 
that those previous recalls, most of them, must have been 
recorded in memory. Some of those previous recalls con-
sisted simply of two unrelated guesses to which the partici-
pants in Lansdale and Laming (1995) accorded the lowest 
rating of confidence. It does not make sense to deliberately 
record such unimportant and irrelevant details; the sim-
plest reading of these findings is that entry into memory, of 
whatever captures our attention, is automatic. This means 
that mnemonically a stimulus is no different from a recall 
and, from this point on, the distinction between stimuli and 
recalls, critical for the preceding analysis, is abandoned.
Instead, the analysis below traces each recall to its ulti-
mate source, stimulus as well as answer, via a chain of inter-
mediate recalls (cp. Fig. 4). Some of those recalls are recalls 
of sources created during the test session, but some can be 
shown to access a particular one of the original stimuli pre-
sented at the beginning of the experiment and accessed after 
some specific lapse of time. In this way recalls during test 
are sorted into some that are presumed to be recalls of pre-
vious recalls (though may alternatively have been retrieved 
directly from a stimulus) or guesses and others that must 
have accessed the original stimuli.
Extracting the data from those eleven participants who 
attended every testing session, Fig. 6 shows, for different 
categories of recall, the proportions of retrievals from origi-
nal stimuli after each lapse of time. These proportions were 
calculated in this manner: For each category of recall in 
Fig. 6 there are trials on which such a recall, if it occurred, 
would have been sourced to the response on some previous 
test trial. Exclude all those trials. The data show the propor-
tions of recalls (obtained directly from a stimulus) on the 
remaining test trials. ‘Total’ is simply the sum of all those 
proportions and in four cases exceeds 1. This happens when 
separate test trials independently access the same original 
stimulus, generating two different retrievals from the same 
source.
The broken yellow curve (overlying the abscissa) is a con-
tinuation of the hyperbola in Fig. 5, with the same parameter 
values. These (Eq. 1) were chosen to approximate the repeti-
tions of previous answers, but at the same time approximated 
the retrievals of yoked pairs, excepting the initial range of 
negative recency. The yoked guesses in Fig. 6 are simply 
yoked pairs sourced from an original stimulus. Laming 
(2019) found that there was no difference between yoked 
pairs and yoked guesses, either in probability of retrieval, in 
confidence or in latency (but with the test trials there imme-
diately following the presentation of the stimuli). Here there 
is a variable, sometimes long, delay between presentation of 
the stimuli and test, resulting in a much smaller proportion 
of yoked guesses.
The proportions of yoked guesses all lie above the curve, 
but this is because nearly all those yoked guesses are no 
more than apparent, arising from the chance coincidence of 





































































Fig. 6  Proportions of retrievals from the original stimuli in relation to 
the lapse of time since presentation. The broken yellow curve contin-
ues the equation in Fig. 5; the broken red curve is a similar equation 
fit to total probability of recall
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of the stimuli. When yoked guesses are aggregated together 
(Table 3), they are marginally significant; but the small sam-
ples represented here in Fig. 6 do not differ significantly 
from chance. It is plausible that this continuation of the 
hyperbola in Fig. 5 represents, approximately, the prob-
ability of retrieving a yoked guess directly from one of the 
stimuli.
The broken red curve in Fig. 6, on the other hand, has 
equation
and presents a passable account of the trend exhibited by 
the total probability of a recall of any kind. It needs to 
be emphasised that while these two relations, one for the 
retrieval of previous errors within the test series and the 
other for recall of stimuli after various, much longer, lapses 
of time are both are modelled with reciprocal functions, the 
constants in those functions (Eqs. 1 and 2) are very different.
‘Holidays’ and ‘Food and Drink’ show a much greater 
proportion of completely correct recalls than do the other 
product groups. To say that student participants are more 
interested in these products does no more than describe what 
is observed. A more substantial reason is suggested in the 
discussion.
Discussion
The first analysis replicated many of the findings in Laming 
(2019)
1. Complete answers, cued pairs and yoked pairs are repro-
duced at highly significant frequencies. The only excep-
tion is BS pairs, either as cued or yoked pairs.
2. When one component of an answer chances to be the 
cue on the next trial, the probability of repeating that 
answer, complete, is high (0.835), except when the for-
mer answer is Null, that is, the confluence of two inde-
pendent guesses.
3. Likewise, when the trial cue points to a previous com-
plete recall of an answer (lag > 0), the probability of 
repetition is much increased, so that the probability of 
repetition of complete answers increases with successive 
repetitions, like completely correct recalls.
4. The probability of repeating a specific trial decreases 
with lag in the same manner as free recalls, except that 
yoked pairs show a negative recency up to lag 8.
All these results were reported by Laming (2019). There 
is nothing here about confidence, of course, because no con-
fidence ratings were recorded; nor anything about latencies. 
But adding in those results from Laming (2019), leads to 
(2)p(t) = 1∕(0.97 + 0.00018 × lapse of time in hours)
this simple model of what one might call the mechanics of 
memory:
1. Every event (a stimulus or a response or just a retrieval) 
to which the participant attends is separately recorded 
in memory, creating an ordered record of those events 
that have engaged the participant’s attention.
2. The compilation of the record is automatic; while atten-
tion to a stimulus is at the participant’s disposal, the 
consequent entry into memory is not.
3. The retrieval of a candidate response from memory is 
spontaneous; a retrieval becomes an overt response if it 
is compatible with the cue.
On the basis of this model the next important question 
concerns the functional decrease in accessibility with lapse 
of time.
‘Short‑term memory’/‘Working memory’
The black dashed curve in Fig. 5 shows that up to 15 min 
the functional decrease is roughly reciprocal. Similar func-
tions would work as well, because, although the data come 
from 5880 test trials, the incidences of repetition of errors 
are parcelled out into 150 sub-categories, containing many 
small samples. However, the relationship is certainly not 1/
ln(time) and arguably not exp{−t} either.
Opportunities to study retention over 4 months are not 
common, but experiments testing retention up to 15 min are 
easy to arrange. Ricker, Vergauwe, and Cowan (2016) have 
published a spirited attempt to rehabilitate the idea of decay 
in memory proposed by Brown (1958). This idea has been 
controversial ever since, the chief alternative being forget-
ting due to interference, especially Keppel and Underwood 
(1962). That is an alternative because when participants fail 
to recall the stimulus, they do not say nothing, they give 
some other response instead. Without repeating the history 
(but see Ricker, Vergauwe, and Cowan, 2016), the nub of the 
controversy is as follows: When a stimulus item fails to be 
recalled, is that because it has decayed in memory beyond 
retrieval and some other response is then substituted in its 
place, or is the record of the stimulus still in good health, 
but some other item has overtaken it? This issue has been 
argued with experiments designed to favour one side or the 
other and usually requiring extra-experimental assumptions 
for the interpretation of their results. One such assumption 
is, of course, ‘decay’ and another such is ‘interference’.
Recently Sadeh, Ozubko, Winocur, & Moscovitch (2016) 
have argued that the distinction between interference and 
decay as agents of forgetting turns on how retention is 
tested, whether by ‘recollection’ or by ‘familiarity’, using 
the ‘remember/know’ procedure (Tulving, 1985). But this 
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confounds the objective study of retention with the purely 
subjective distinction between recollection and familiarity.
The idea of spontaneous retrieval (Laming, 2019) leads to 
another and, to my mind, simpler view of this controversy. 
First, a stimulus is simply an entry in memory whose recall, 
or failure of recall, is recorded by the experimenter. Beyond 
attention from the experimenter, a stimulus is not mnemoni-
cally different from any other entry, a retrieval of an error or 
a guess. Next, if the item actually recalled is more recent (of 
smaller lag) than the stimulus, that is said to be ‘retroactive 
interference’; if it is more remote, ‘proactive interference’. It 
is not that the item recalled has ‘interfered’ with the stimu-
lus; simply that the mechanics of memory has selected from 
several different sources according to their relative acces-
sibilities (cf. Fig. 5). In an experiment designed to favour 
one side or the other in this controversy, participants might 
adopt some particular strategy that distorts the results. For 
example,
“Demonstrating the existence of time-based decay in 
short-term memory and pinpointing its rate is espe-
cially hard because our cognitive system has at least 
two mechanisms at its disposal to fight against forget-
ting: attentional refreshing and articulatory rehearsal 
(Camos, Lagner, & Barrouillet, 2011; Hudjetz & 
Oberauer, 2007)”. Ricker, Vergauwe, and Cowan 
(2016, p. 1989).
But attentional refreshing and articulatory rehearsal work 
by recording additional entries in memory; they do not alter 
the mechanics exemplified in Fig. 5. It needs to be empha-
sized that the recalls in Fig. 5 are incidental observations. 
The participants had no instruction about recalling their 
previous responses—nothing at all was said—those recalls 
happened naturally.
There has, of course, to be some decrease in accessibility 
like the black dashed curve in Fig. 5, because we are only 
able to recall one image at a time. The distribution of acces-
sibility over a lifetime of memories cannot be uniform and 
it happens to be weighted towards the most recent. (What 
would human society be like if it were weighted at the other 
end?). Brown (1958) was taking a punt at the form of that 
relation. Cowan, Saults, and Nugent (1997) have suggested 
three different meanings of the term ‘decay’, and their first, 
“the loss of the ability to recall the target item across a period 
of time, not caused by interference.” is compatible with the 
reciprocal function in Fig. 5, and it would help to choose 
some term other than ‘decay’, which misleads. What matters 
is the nature of the relationship between lag and accessibil-
ity, and why it exists, and it would clear the air to eschew 
any term that purports a priori to dictate what that relation 
should be. Instead, what is needed is a hypothesis that relates 
directly to experimental observation. The Brown–Peterson 
experiment is one of the principal paradigms used to study 
retention of over short periods of time, and Laming (1992) 
showed all the principal findings could be accommodated 
with a weighting function decreasing as the reciprocal of 
elapsed time.
Retention over the longer term.
The second analysis addresses retention over a longer time 
frame by identifying a category of recalls that necessarily 
(chance guesses excepted) accessed the original stimuli and 
thereby reflect the effect of delay. The trend of ‘total recalls’ 
can be modelled as a reciprocal (Eq. 2), like the relation in 
Fig. 4. But it is plain that the functional relation that approxi-
mates retrievals in Fig. 4 up to 15 min, does not apply to 
‘total recalls’ in Fig. 5 for delays exceeding 20 min.
The most important deviation from that trend is the 
marked increase in complete BPS recalls after 1 h (relative 
to 30 min—supper was served in between these two test ses-
sions) and, even more, after 14.6 h, overnight. The improve-
ment after 1 h is reminiscent of Shepard’s (1967) study of 
the recall of pictures, a study that was specifically borne in 
mind in the design of this investigation. Shepard’s partici-
pants looked through an inspection series of 612 coloured 
pictures, followed immediately by a 2-alternative recognition 
test on 68 pairs of pictures, one seen before, one new. Four 
of the 34 participants were retested two hours later with 68 
different pairs of pictures; 96.7% correct on the immediate 
test increased to 99.7% (one error by one participant only) 
after two hours. But this is to compare the performance of a 
particular four participants with the complete cohort of 34.
The second improvement overnight might suggest the 
effect of ‘sleeping on it’ (Wagner et al., 2004). In that study 
participants who slept overnight between training on a prob-
lem and test were significantly more successful than those 
who had stayed awake for an equivalent length of time, 
either overnight or within the same day. However, the com-
parison here is between different product groups, and it is 
plausible that Holidays (1 h) and Food and Drink (14.6 h) 
proved much more memorable to student participants than, 
say, Perfumes (30 min) and Jewellery (4 months). It was 
assumed, by default, that, provided care was taken to exclude 
extraneous cues to the associations between Brand, Picture 
and Slogan, the different product groups would be compa-
rable. This is manifestly not so (and constitutes a caution for 
further research). It presents a problem that invites compari-
son with the work of Ballard (1913).
Ballard was an HM Inspector of Schools in London dur-
ing the first decade of the twentieth century, a time when rote 
learning of poetry was a substantial component of primary 
education. He took advantage of his appointment to test the 
learning ability of many groups of schoolchildren, mostly 
aged 11–14. They would be asked to learn a poem with 
deliberately insufficient time to achieve complete mastery 
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and were then asked to write out as much as they could 
remember. Ballard would return unexpectedly a few days 
later and ask the schoolchildren to write the poem out again. 
Scoring the number of whole lines reproduced without error, 
that number increased on repeated test, over the score on 
the initial test, by up to 20% (see Woodworth & Schlosberg, 
1955, Fig. 25–6, p. 794). Since retention usually decreases 
with lapse of time, this increase seemed paradoxical, and 
was labelled ‘reminiscence’.
Reminiscence (more recently ‘hypermnesia’) has proved 
a fragile phenomenon, sometimes difficult to replicate (for 
reviews, see Payne, 1987; Erdelyi, 2010). But the principle 
that every event to which the participant attends is separately 
recorded in memory means that lines of poetry written dur-
ing the initial test would have been recorded in memory 
and available for retrieval on a subsequent test. Moreover, 
because those lines had been output, they would have been 
more accessible than the original learning (cf. the ‘gen-
eration’ effect, Slamecka and Graf, 1978, and the ‘testing’ 
effect, Izawa, 1971, p. 201; Roediger and Karpicke, 2006). 
This mechanical manipulation of entries in memory was 
validated by Roediger and Thorpe (1978), who presented 
their participants with a list of 50 words or 50 pictures (to 
be recalled by verbal label). Participants asked to recall 
the list three times in successive 7 min periods produced a 
greater number of words in each successive period, presum-
ably by retrieving their previous responses. However, their 
cumulative recall was no greater than that of a control group 
given 21 min for a single recall, suggesting that hypermnesia 
results simply from increased opportunity to recall.
It is relevant that Ballard scored the number of lines 
reproduced without error. This is analogous to selecting 
completely correct recalls only in Fig. 4. Ballard’s second 
test, of course, showed an increased amount recalled (as 
did Roediger and Thorpe, 1978, above). But the schoolchil-
dren had no access to the poem in between whiles and the 
mnemonic process has to be a martingale. If Ballard had 
examined lines that were reproduced incorrectly, he surely 
would have found his school children repeating their errors 
as well on the second test. In short, reminiscence looks to 
be analogous to the increase in the proportion of completely 
correct recalls with successive tests in Fig. 4 and so an arte-
fact resulting from a biased selection of data. Nevertheless, 
Ballard’s work has specific relevance to the enhanced recall 
of ‘Holidays’ and ‘Food and Drink’.
Ballard discovered that if his schoolchildren had previ-
ously learned the poem set for them to learn (but four years 
previously; Ballard, 1913, p. 35), reminiscence was greatly 
increased (147% in the space of two days). It is plausible that 
the student participants in the present experiment had previ-
ously looked at advertisements for Holidays and for Food 
and Drink to a much greater extent than, say, Perfumes or 
Jewellery. Analogy with Ballard’s report suggests a reason 
for enhanced recall.
Experiments on retention
There is a practical difficulty to studying retention over long 
periods of time – commanding the attendance of a suffi-
ciently large cohort of participants. This was a student pro-
ject using friends of the experimenters – easily engaged, but 
their attendance was subject to other demands and had to be 
fitted in to their academic year. The entire cohort needed to 
be tested after each different lapse of time. Using different 
sets of material to test after each different delay finessed 
the problem of interference (confusion between different 
sets of material), but those different sets (product groups of 
advertisements) do not appear comparable. Shepard (1967) 
showed his participants the same inspection series of 612 
coloured pictures, but then tested different sub-cohorts after 
each delay, testing each sub-cohort on the same test series. 
This finessed the problem of interference and also equated 
the material of the tests, but shifted the potential lack of 
comparability onto the sub-cohorts. Kruger (1929), using 
lists of 12 monosyllabic nouns, arranged for different par-
ticipants to be tested on different lists after different delays in 
a Latin square design. This equalised both participants and 
material with respect to the different intervals of retention. 
The ideal solution, of course, is captive participants who 
can be tested over successive delays in succession (Ebbing-
haus, 1964; Bachem, 1954). It avoids all these problems, 
but, assuming the present participants could have been per-
suaded, the present experiment would then have taken seven 
months.
The fragmentation hypothesis
Very recently Joensen, Gaskell & Horner (2019) have posed 
the question whether a complex stimulus (a triple associate 
in their experiments) is forgotten all-or-none or by progres-
sive loss of individual components. This is the same ques-
tion with which this present investigation began. Their triple 
associates consisted of a location, a famous person and a 
common object, with 60 alternatives for each component 
that could be substituted in any combination. Each triple was 
presented as three pairs (location, person), (person, object) 
and (object, location) on separate trials, interspersed, of 
course, with the presentation of other pairs. It was assumed 
that the three separate pairs would be integrated into a single 
engram. Recall was tested by presenting one component as 
cue with a six-alternative forced-choice test for one other 
component, one component only, giving six separate test 
trials for each triple. Half the triples were tested immedi-
ately and the other half after 12 h (1 week in Experiments 
2, 3 and 4).
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Joensen et al.’s initial unit of analysis was a 2 × 2 table 
(Table 4 below) recording the combinations of responses to 
each cue. They calculated a measure of ‘Retrieval depend-
ency’, which was the excess of the sum of the diagonal 
entries over what those entries would have been if accuracy 
were maintained but the responses were otherwise independ-
ent; that is
where a, b, c and d are the proportions of entries in each cell 
in Table 4, so that a + b + c + d = 1.
“If complex events fragment as a function of forgetting, 
such that some aspects of the memory trace are forgotten 
more quickly than others…, then we would expect to see a 
decrease in dependency over time.” (Joensen et al., p. 12).
However, there is another, simpler and more informative, 
way to answer the question posed by Joensen et al. Assemble 
the responses to all three cues pointing to a given engram 
in a 3 × 3 matrix as in Table 1. Then the structure of the 
engram (cf. Fig. 1) dictates a particular combination of cor-
rect responses (see Jones, 1978; Lansdale & Laming, 1995). 
Conversely, the pattern of correct responses in a matrix like 
Table 1 enables the structure of the engram to be identified 
individually for each separate triple, whence the answer to 
the question posed by Joensen, Gaskell & Horner (2019) 
follows immediately.
However, there are problems. First, correct guesses will 
obscure the pattern of correct responses (and it is now a pity 
that Joensen et al. did not present their participants with a 
60-alternative forced choice). Second, even after correcting 
for guessing, one must expect combinations of responses 
that do not fit any of the patterns in Fig. 1 (see Lansdale & 
Laming, 1995). Such patterns arise because many of the 
recalls are not recalls of the original engram, but of inter-
mediate recalls from previous test trials (Laming, 2019, and 
the analysis above). Here is the crux of the problem: The 
analysis in Table 1 (and in Tables 4 and 5 and in Joensen, 
Gaskell & Horner, 2019) assumes that all cues pointing to 
a given triple access the same engram. This is not so here, 
nor in Lansdale & Laming (1995; see Laming 2019), and it 
is to be expected that if Joensen et al., performed a similar 
sequential analysis on their data, similar relationships would 
be discovered.
(3)
Retrieval dependency = (a + d) − [(a + b)(a + c) + (b + d)(c + d)],
It seems intuitive that the projection of the engram of a 
triple associate onto recall should be one of the five patterns 
in Fig. 1 and, moreover, that forgetting must subsist either 
in the loss of individual elements or of the disappearance 
of the entire engram. It is intuitive because these are all the 
questions that one can ask of a 3-component engram.
But this is not at all necessary. Analysis of the recalls 
of the advertisements showed that many were retrievals of 
previous recalls (Fig. 3) and that such recalls occur in chains 
(recalls of recalls of recalls, Fig. 4). More generally, failure 
to recall a particular engram inserts an additional entry at 
the head of the mnemonic record, so that the probability of 
recall of the original engram on a second attempt is reduced 
– its lag is increased by 1 and this results in reduced acces-
sibility (Fig. 5). One might suppose that, if the attempt to 
recall were continued long enough, it would eventually suc-
ceed, but this turns out not to be true – not even in an infinite 
series of attempts (Laming, 2009). So, forgetting – specifi-
cally, failure to recall—is consistent with complete preser-
vation of the original engram. Moreover, because one can 
never know that distinct recalls are retrievals of the same 
engram, it is not even possible to identify its structure.
How then does memory work?
This Discussion began with a simple model of what one 
might call the mechanics of memory:
Every event (a stimulus or a response or just a retrieval) 
to which the participant attends is separately recorded 
in memory, creating an ordered record of those events 
that have engaged the participant’s attention.
This is suggested here by the analysis of repeated errors. 
The total number of trials on which some previous error was 
repeated is 1495. Delete from the total number of test trials 
(5880) those on which recall was completely correct, and 
delete also the first test cycle through the stimuli, because 
an error cannot be repeated until after it has been made. This 
leaves 2272 trials of which 65.8% included a repetition of an 
error of some kind. We cannot, of course, know about those 
previous responses that were not repeated, but repetition of 
previous errors in recall is common.
The compilation of the record is automatic; while 
attention to a stimulus is at the participant’s disposal, 
the consequent entry into memory is not.
This may seem counter-intuitive. I draw this distinction: 
Fixing attention on particular stimulus material (e.g., non-
sense syllables) may require a great deal of conscious effort 
or (a football match) may not. But attention then guarantees 
entry into memory; entry into memory is a pragmatic defini-
tion of attention. It enables all sorts of everyday events to 
be recorded without any specific intention to retain. Some 
Table 4  Initial unit of analysis 
in the experiment by Joensen, 
Gaskell & Horner (2019)
The entries a, b, c and d are 
proportions, so that they sum 
to 1
Cue A B√ ¬B
C√ a b
¬C c d
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of the response combinations repeated in Fig. 3 consisted 
of two independent guesses (Null responses). It is difficult 
to think of any other reason why such responses should be 
retained in memory for future recall.
The retrieval of a candidate response from memory is 
spontaneous; a retrieval becomes an overt response if it 
is compatible with the cue; that is, a cue functions only 
in retrospect to select an appropriate response after it 
has been retrieved.
Yoked pairs in Table 3 are an example. They are compat-
ible with the trial cue, but otherwise have no connection 
with it.
In free recall, after a first flush of recalls accessed by 
continuing the process of rehearsal (Laming, 2006, 2008), 
recalls are found to include words already recalled, intru-
sions from previous lists and even from outside the experi-
ment altogether (Diesfeldt, 2017; Howard & Kahana, 1999; 
Laming, 2012, reanalysing data from Murdock and Okada, 
1970). The mechanics exemplified in Fig. 5 brings a word to 
mind: Is this one of the words I was asked to remember? Is 
it a word I have already recalled? How is the participant to 
know? Within the context of the experiment such a retrieval 
is spontaneous and the participant has to guess: Davis, Gel-
ler, Rizzuto, and Kahana (2008) have demonstrated similar 
intrusions in the recall of paired associates.
The analysis of repeated errors affords a more primitive 
insight into the mechanics of memory than other presently 
existing procedures. The serial position curve of free recall 
(Murdock, 1962; see Laming, 2010 for its variants) is well 
known; the data in Fig. 5 exemplify the process that gen-
erates that curve. Likewise, data that suggest all-or-none 
learning and the fragmentation hypothesis are generated by 
the repetition of previous recalls, correct and part-correct 
(Laming, 2019). Repetitions of previous errors are incidental 
observations, unconstrained. They are properties of mem-
ory, not of the experiment, and should extrapolate without 
restriction.
The relation between accessibility and lapse of time, how-
ever, presents an unsolved problem. The analysis of repeated 
errors provides data (Fig. 5) on the decrease in accessibility 
over the short term, up to 15 min. That same analysis identi-
fies certain responses as retrievals from the original stimuli 
presented at various times previously. The total proportion 
of such retrievals (Fig. 6) provides data on accessibility over 
the longer term, 20 min to 4 months. Both relations can be 
characterised by a reciprocal function (Eqs. 1 and 2), but the 
constants of those functions are very different.
There have been very many studies of retention over 
short periods of time and a proportionate number of mod-
els, so much so that it has become common to speak of 
‘short-term memory’ or ‘working memory’ as though 
these topics had no connection with retention over the 
longer term. But there is, to my knowledge, no experi-
mental evidence to show that there are two distinct pro-
cesses. The disconnect proceeds from the ready availabil-
ity of participants for studies over a short term compared 
with the difficulty of testing memory over much longer 
intervals (autobiographical memory excepted, Bahrick 
1983, 1984).
This present study has recorded recall over both the 
short term and also over much longer intervals under cir-
cumstances in which the only relevant variable appears 
to be lapse of time. The data show that accessibility of an 
original stimulus is absolutely less than that of a recent test 
trial (of course), but extrapolation of Eq. 2 to short delays 
would give an enhanced recall, greatly enhanced over that 
represented by Eq. 1 (cf. Figure 6). So, if there are two 
distinct processes, one for retrieval in the short term, up 
to 15 min, and the other over longer terms, why can the 
‘longer term’ process not be brought to bear on short-term 
retrieval? Putting this question the other way round, how 
does the short-term process, as reflected in Fig. 5, produce 
such enhanced recall from the original stimuli? Is this not 
a comparison of like with like, after all? Or does the com-
parison with the report from Ballard (1913) hint at a much 
more complicated structure over the long term?
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